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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants – Pennsylvania Department of Correction 
Commissioner Jeffrey Beard, SCI-Muncy Warden Martin 
Dragovich, and the Northumberland District Attorney 
(hereinafter “Commonwealth”) – appeal the District Court’s 
order granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus sought 
by Appellee Judy Ann Showers under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.   
 
I. 
  
On March 23, 1994, a jury convicted Showers of first 
degree murder of her husband.  Showers was represented by 
Michael Rudinski at the trial where it was established that the 
cause of her husband’s death was an orally consumed lethal 
dose of liquid morphine, otherwise referred to by the brand 
name Roxanol.   
 
The Commonwealth argued that Showers 
surreptitiously administered the lethal dose.  It relied on 
circumstantial evidence and the testimony of its expert 
witness Dr. Isidore Mihalakis, M.D., a forensic pathologist, 
that Roxanol is capable of being masked.  The defense argued 
that the deceased committed suicide.  Showers was sentenced 
to life imprisonment without parole.   
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Showers retained William Costopoulos as her 
appellate counsel who timely filed a direct appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court.  Costopoulos raised several 
issues but did not argue that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call an expert witness in rebuttal.  The Superior 
Court affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Showers, 681 A.2d 746, 
757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (“Showers I”).1
  
    
Showers retained new counsel, Caroline Roberto, to 
file a petition for collateral relief under Pennsylvania’s Post 
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541 et seq.  
In the petition, Showers claimed for the first time ineffective 
assistance of both her trial and appellate counsel.  She 
asserted that her trial counsel failed to present rebuttal expert 
testimony regarding the properties of Roxanol, and that her 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the same 
on direct appeal.   
  
At the evidentiary hearing on the PCRA petition, 
Showers presented the testimony of Dr. Cyril Wecht, M.D., 
J.D., then Coroner of Allegheny County, and a nationally 
recognized and acclaimed forensic pathologist.  Dr. Wecht 
testified, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the 
lethal dose could not have been administered surreptitiously 
or forcefully and that Showers’ husband likely committed 
suicide.  Dr. Wecht also testified that he would have testified 
the same if he had been called as a witness during the jury 
trial in 1994.   
 
Showers also presented the testimony of Dr. Harry 
Doyle, a psychiatrist retained by the defense at the time of the 
trial to investigate the state of mind of Showers’ husband.  Dr. 
Doyle determined that the central question was whether the 
morphine was taken voluntarily or surreptitiously, but did not 
                                              
      1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a petition for 
allowance of appeal.  Commonwealth v. Showers, 685 A.2d 
544 (Pa. 1996).  The United States Supreme Court denied a 
petition for writ of certiorari.  Showers v. Pennsylvania, 520 
U.S. 1213 (1997). 
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have the necessary scientific background to testify regarding 
the properties of Roxanol.  He therefore advised Rudinski to 
secure a qualified expert to address the impossibility of 
disguising Roxanol, and provided him with contact 
information for three potential witnesses.  Rudinski did not 
contact any of those experts. 
 
At the PCRA hearing, Rudinski testified that he 
believed that Helen Wolfe, a lay witness friend, would be the 
most reliable witness regarding whether Roxanol can be 
disguised.2
 
  Rudinski testified that he did not cross-examine 
Dr. Mihalakis about the absence of a masking substance 
because he “recall[ed]” that there was some other type of 
fluid found in the deceased’s stomach.  App. at 250.  
Rudinski explained that he did not ask Dr. Mihalakis 
additional questions regarding the lack of any evidence of 
force because it “can be very dangerous” to ask questions for 
which “you don’t know all of the answers.”  App. at 251.   
Costopoulos, Showers’ appellate counsel, testified that 
he relied solely on the record, and did not conduct an 
independent investigation to determine whether to pursue the 
issue of the failure of trial counsel to call a contrary expert.  
App. at 273.  Significantly, he stated that “if [he] had to do it 
over again, having lost on direct appeal with the issues [he] 
                                              
2 Wolfe, who was a friend of the deceased as well as a 
cancer patient, had been prescribed Roxanol.  She testified 
that there is no way to mask the taste of Roxanol.  She also 
testified that the deceased had administered Roxanol to her 
and had asked pharmacists about how to administer it 
properly.  Wolfe testified that the deceased knew “more about 
liquid Roxanol” than she did even though she was a nurse.  
App. at 22.  The dissenting Superior Court judge suggested 
that Wolfe was biased and unknowledgeable.  Commonwealth 
v. Showers, 782 A.2d 1010, 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(Tamilia, J., dissenting).  There was evidence that Wolfe 
previously had an affair with the deceased and Wolfe’s sister 
was having an affair with him at the time of his death.  
Showers v. Beard, 586 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
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had raised, [he] absolutely would have raised [trial counsel’s 
failure to call an expert on rebuttal].”  App. at 274.   
 
The court denied the PCRA petition, finding that 
Rudinski had made diligent efforts to locate an expert witness 
and that he vigorously cross-examined Dr. Mihalakis.  
Showers appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  A 
two-judge majority of the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA 
judgment.  With respect to Showers’ argument regarding the 
failure to call an expert witness, the Superior Court found that 
Rudinski adequately addressed the issue in his cross-
examination of Dr. Mihalakis and in his closing argument.  
Commonwealth v. Showers, 782 A.2d 1010, 1021 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2001) (“Showers II”).  With respect to appellate counsel, 
the Superior Court found that “[b]ased upon [] Costopoulos’ 
articulation of reasons for not raising certain issues [on 
appeal],” Showers did not meet her burden of proof “to show 
that his course of action did not have a rational, strategic, or 
tactical basis.”  Id. at 1019 (quotation omitted).  One member 
of the Superior Court panel filed a vigorous dissent.  Id. at 
1023-24 (Tamilia, J., dissenting).3
 
   
Showers timely filed the instant petition for writ of 
habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) seeking a new trial.  Showers alleges 
that her trial counsel failed to present rebuttal expert 
testimony from an available forensic pathologist, and 
appellate counsel failed to preserve the issue.  The District 
Court granted Showers’ petition on this ground.  Showers v. 
Beard, 586 F. Supp. 2d 310 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (“Showers III”).  
The Commonwealth’s appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1291 and 2253.  Our review of the District Court’s decision is 
                                              
       3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Showers’ 
petition for allowance of appeal.  Commonwealth v. Showers, 
814 A.2d 677 (Pa. 2002).   
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plenary.  See Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Under AEDPA, where, as here, a habeas petitioner’s 
claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, our 
review is limited to determining whether the state court 
decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable 
application of Supreme Court precedent or an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the state court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Our review is 
“doubly deferential:” the state court was obligated to conduct 
deferential review of counsel’s performance and we must 
give deference to the state court rulings under AEDPA.  
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009).   
 
As a preliminary matter, we reject the 
Commonwealth’s objections to our consideration of this 
appeal.  We conclude that Showers preserved the instant 
claims and the Commonwealth has waived its procedural 
default argument, raising this issue for the first time after over 
a decade of post conviction litigation.4
 
  See Trest v. Cain, 522 
U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (in habeas context, procedural default is 
normally a defense the Commonwealth is obligated to raise).  
Showers properly layered her claims in the collateral 
proceedings.5
                                              
     4 The PCRA court and the Superior Court addressed the 
ineffectiveness claims against both trial and appellate counsel 
on the merits.   
  Under Pennsylvania law, where ineffectiveness 
claims are properly layered, there is no waiver and no 
procedural default.  Siehl v. Grace, 561 F.3d 189, 193-94 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2009) (If the claims as to trial counsel have merit, a 
 
     5 Prior to Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 
2002), which held ineffectiveness claims should be raised 
collaterally, “defendants were required to raise all claims 
alleging ineffective assistance at the first stage at which they 
were represented by new counsel.”  Commonwealth v. 
Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 773 n.16 (Pa. 2009).  The change in 
law effected by Grant does not apply retroactively to 
Showers.  See Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 
1070 n.2 (Pa. 2003). 
7 
 
similar determination will likely be made regarding claims as 
to appellate counsel, “in which event there would be no 
waiver under Pennsylvania’s layering of ineffective 
assistance line of cases,” and “no procedural default by virtue 
of the doctrine of cause and prejudice.”) (quotation omitted).  
As a result, in reviewing the Superior Court’s decision, the 
District Court properly evaluated trial counsel’s performance 
on the merits as a necessary predicate for evaluating appellate 
counsel’s performance.  See Commonwealth v. Rush, 838 
A.2d 651, 656 (Pa. 2003) (“[W]hen a court is faced with a 
‘layered’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the only 
viable ineffectiveness claim is that related to the most recent 
counsel, appellate counsel.”).  We thus turn to the merits.   
 
Coincidentally, shortly after this case was argued 
before this court, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in a 
case where a petitioner convicted of murder in a state court 
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of ineffective 
assistance.  Because of what may appear to be facial 
similarity between that decision, Harrington v. Richter, 131 
S. Ct. 770 (2011), and the one before us, we asked the parties 
to file supplemental memoranda regarding the effect of that 
decision on the issues in this case.   
 
Richter was convicted of the murder of Klein largely 
on the testimony of Johnson, a drug dealer with whom 
Richter and Klein had been smoking marijuana on the day at 
issue.  Johnson testified that he and Klein were shot by 
Richter and Branscombe in Johnson’s apartment.  Richter, 
131 S. Ct. at 781-82.  Richter’s defense attorney sought to 
show that Klein was shot in the bedroom doorway but the 
prosecution introduced expert testimony based on Klein’s 
blood pattern that Klein was shot near the living room couch.  
Although Richter’s attorney called seven witnesses, the jury 
found Richter guilty.  Id. at 782.  The California Supreme 
Court rejected Richter’s Strickland claims by summary 
denial, and the District Court agreed.  Id. at 783.  The Ninth 
Circuit reversed by a divided en banc vote, holding the 
California decision was unreasonable because Richter’s trial 
counsel was deficient for failing to consult experts on blood 
evidence.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed 
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the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding the Court of 
Appeals erred in finding that Richter’s attorney was deficient 
under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), for evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.6
 
   
In the response of Showers’ attorney to this court’s 
request for comment, she stated that habeas review “remains 
robust [as] evidenced by the many cases in which the 
Supreme Court has granted relief because a state court 
adjudication of a meritorious constitutional claim was 
‘unreasonable’ or ‘contrary to’ Supreme Court precedent, or 
was based upon an unreasonable factual determination.”7
 
   
In Richter, the Supreme Court stated “[t]he pivotal 
question is whether the state court’s application of the 
Strickland standard was unreasonable.  This is different from 
asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below 
                                              
     6 First, a petitioner “must show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient” in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Second, a petitioner must show 
that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.  Id. at 694 
(prejudice, if reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, result “would have been different”).  See also Werts v. 
Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2000) (Pennsylvania 
standard judging ineffectiveness claims is identical to the 
Strickland standard). 
 
7 She noted the recent decisions in Sears v. Upton, 130 S. 
Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) (granting relief because state court 
misapplied Strickland prejudice standard); Porter v. 
McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) (awarding habeas 
relief because state court’s determination that petitioner did 
not suffer Strickland prejudice “unreasonable”); Miller-El v. 
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 235 (2005) (granting habeas relief 
under AEDPA); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005) 
(same); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003) (same); 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000) (same). 
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Strickland’s standard.”  131 S. Ct. at 785.  The Court then 
proceeded to explain “that habeas corpus is a guard against 
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not 
a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”  Id. 
at 786 (quotation omitted).  The Court noted that even under 
de novo review the standard for judging counsel’s 
representation is a most deferential one; the question is 
whether an attorney’s representation amounted to 
incompetence under “prevailing professional norms.”  Id. at 
788 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).  
 
The Richter Court held that in a habeas proceeding 
whether a state court is “within the bounds of a reasonable 
judicial determination . . . to conclude that defense counsel 
follow a strategy that did not require the use of experts” 
depends on the specific circumstances of the case.  Id. at 789.  
Based on the facts in Richter, the Supreme Court concluded 
that it was reasonable for the state court to find that Richter’s 
defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to consult 
forensic blood experts or introduce expert evidence.  Id. at 
789-90.  In discussing the circumstances, the Supreme Court 
stated that the potentially exculpatory forensic evidence was 
not apparent at the time of the trial.  Id. at 789 (Strickland and 
AEDPA prevent “[r]eliance on the harsh light of hindsight to 
cast doubt on a trial that took place now more than 15 years 
ago.”) (quotation omitted).  Further, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that even if expert testimony had been available, 
defense counsel was entitled not to use it because there was a 
“serious risk” that it could have “destroy[ed]” the defendant’s 
case and distracted the jury from assessing the credibility of 
the defendant’s testimony.  Id. at 790.  The Court concluded 
that counsel in Richter put on a thorough defense, vigorously 
cross-examined the prosecution’s expert, and called seven 
witnesses, including the defendant himself.  Id. at 782, 791. 
 
The facts in Richter were radically different from the 
facts and circumstances here.  The dissenting judge in the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that “[t]he defining issue 
in this matter is whether the victim, who according to the 
Commonwealth’s theory unknowingly ingested a toxic 
substance, Roxanol (liquid morphine), would have or could 
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have done so without any evidence that the drug’s acute 
bitterness was masked so as to conceal its presence.”  
Showers II, 782 A.2d at 1023 (Tamilia, J., dissenting).  The 
properties of  Roxanol and the autopsy results were known 
well before the trial.  If Roxanol could not be masked by 
another substance, the only plausible explanation for the 
manner of death would have been willing, self-administration.  
The Commonwealth’s evidence in the case against Showers, 
other than expert testimony regarding the properties of liquid 
morphine, was wholly circumstantial, making scientific 
evidence all the more important.  See Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 
F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is especially important 
for counsel to seek the advice of an expert when he has no 
knowledge or expertise about the field.”).  Dr. Doyle 
provided Showers’ counsel with the names of three experts 
but counsel failed to consult even one of the three experts that 
Dr. Doyle had already suggested would have supported the 
defense’s suicide theory. 
 
The Superior Court rejected Showers’ claim that 
Rudinski, Showers’ defense counsel, was deficient because 
his cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s expert 
effectively elicited testimony helpful to the defense.  Showers 
II, 782 A.2d at 1021.  The District Court concluded that the 
Superior Court’s decision was unreasonable.  After Dr. Doyle 
told Rudinski that he was not qualified to testify to the crucial 
properties of Roxanol, “it was incumbent upon Attorney 
Rudinski to produce” an expert who could so testify.  
Showers III, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 329.  The record reflects 
“little meaningful effort” on Rudinski’s part to do so.  Id.   
 
Although Rudinski elicited testimony from Dr. 
Mihalakis, the prosecutor’s expert, that he had only tasted two 
drops of Roxanol for the purpose of the litigation and never 
tried the substance in a masking agent, this testimony was not 
nearly as strong as that which could have been provided by an 
expert, such as Dr. Wecht.8
                                              
     8 Questions posed by counsel themselves do not constitute 
evidence that can be considered by the jury and the trial court 
instructed the jury in this regard.  See Pa. SSJI (Crim), §2.07 
  Rudinski relied on the testimony 
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of Wolfe, who was hardly an expert on Roxanol.  Indeed, 
Rudinski stated in his closing that Wolfe had only tried the 
drug once in a masking agent.9
 
  Her lack of expertise was 
further undermined by her suspect credibility.  See supra note 
2. 
Rudinski failed to establish key facts that could have 
led a jury to find that Showers’ husband voluntarily 
consumed the morphine.  Most importantly, the defense failed 
to establish that a large dose of Roxanol cannot be masked 
without a large amount of liquid or food, if at all, and that no 
such substance was found in the deceased’s stomach.  
Rudinski’s failure to adequately question Dr. Mihalakis was 
based on Rudinski’s flawed understanding of the facts.  At the 
PCRA hearing, Rudinski testified that he did not ask follow-
up questions regarding the masking agent because he believed 
that the autopsy revealed some other type of fluid in the 
deceased’s stomach.  There was no such evidence.  See App. 
at 204-05.  He likewise did not follow up on the lack of 
evidence of force because he feared asking questions for 
which he did not know the answers.  This court agrees that it 
may be risky for an attorney to ask questions for which he 
believes the answer may be harmful.  However, it is no 
excuse for failing to elicit significant evidence when the risk 
of an adverse response has been created by counsel’s failure 
to conduct a thorough investigation or understand key, 
undisputed facts in the record.  See Couch v. Booker, 632 
F.3d 241, 246 (6th Cir. 2011) (“To make a reasoned judgment 
                                                                                                     
(2005) (“The questions that counsel put to the witnesses are 
not evidence.”).  To the extent the Superior Court reviewing 
the PCRA petition relied on the questions themselves in 
making this determination, such reliance is unreasonable. 
 
     9 At the PCRA hearing, Rudinski testified that Wolfe took 
the drug on a daily basis to bolster his decision to rely on her 
testimony in lieu of an expert.  However, this contradicts 
Rudinski’s minimization of Wolfe’s exposure to Roxanol in 
his closing statement to the jury. 
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about whether evidence is worth presenting, one must know 
what it says.”). 
 
Although Rudinski did prepare and present some 
evidence favorable to Showers at her trial, it was not 
outweighed by his serious omissions.  Rudinski failed to 
investigate readily available key evidence in support of the 
defense’s chosen theory, i.e., that Showers’ husband 
committed suicide, or make a reasonable decision that 
investigation was unnecessary.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
691 (“counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or 
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary”).  See also Porter v. McCollum, 
130 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2009) (penalty phase representation 
found deficient where counsel “told the jury that [defendant] . 
. . was not mentally healthy” but failed to investigate or 
present readily available evidence which would have proven 
this very fact) (quotation omitted); Rompilla v. Beard,  545 
U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (attorney has duty to investigate all 
avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits); Couch, 632 
F.3d at 246 (state court unreasonably rejected habeas 
petitioner’s argument that counsel should have investigated 
causation defense where counsel ignored readily available 
evidence); Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 329 (1st Cir. 
2005) (representation found deficient where counsel failed to 
investigate “not arson” defense and seek expert assistance or 
educate himself on techniques of defending arson).   
 
Although “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys 
would not defend a particular client in the same way,” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, even the most minimally 
competent attorney here would have consulted at least one of 
the experts suggested to him by Dr. Doyle.  Testimony by any 
of the available experts would have injected significant doubt 
regarding Showers’ guilt.  Reliance on Wolfe was not 
objectively reasonable.           
 
This court and others have overturned a state court on 
habeas review based on deficient performance even where 
experts had been consulted but defense counsel failed to seek 
a second opinion when the facts so warranted.  See, e.g., 
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Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290, 302 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(defense counsel’s failure to obtain additional psychiatric 
evaluation of defendant’s mental capacity to stand trial 
deficient because previous evaluations were equivocal and 
client’s behavior would have put competent counsel on 
notice); Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“[T]he mere hiring of an expert is meaningless if 
counsel does not consult with that expert to make an informed 
decision about whether a particular defense is viable.”).  
 
We do not hold that defense attorneys must always 
enlist expert testimony but it depends on the specific 
circumstances of the case.  The 1989 American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) Guideline for Appointment and 
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which is 
informative, albeit not dispositive, calls for retention of expert 
witnesses when necessary or appropriate for preparation of 
the defense, adequate understanding of the prosecution’s case 
and rebuttal of any portion of the prosecution’s case at the 
guilt/innocence phase.  § 11.4.1(D)(7).  The District Court 
held that the 1989 Guideline is relevant for evaluating 
prevailing norms and provides added support for its 
conclusion that Rudinski provided deficient performance and 
that the Superior Court’s contrary conclusion was 
unreasonable.10
 
  See Hummel, 564 F.3d at 297 (“The [ABA] 
standards are guides, but only guides, to what is 
reasonable.”).  We agree. 
In the words of Judge Tamilia, the dissenting member 
of the Pennsylvania Superior Court:  “[R]ebuttal testimony by 
                                              
    10 The Supreme Court case cited by the Commonwealth for 
the proposition that ABA standards “do not have any special 
relevance for assessing attorney performance” is inapposite.  
Appellant’s Br. at 30 (citing Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 
13, 20 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring)).  In that case, the court 
of appeals used the wrong ABA standards, those from 
eighteen years after the defendant’s trial, so the Court merely 
found that those standards did not speak to the current 
prevailing norms, not that the then effective standards would 
not be relevant.   
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an independent, credible expert witness was necessary to 
present to the jury the sharp, crucial contrast between 
voluntary and involuntary ingestion of a bitter toxic 
substance, the single most critical element in this case, as well 
as evidence or lack thereof relating to refluxation,” such 
testimony was indisputably available, and it “would have 
been far more convincing to the jury than that of a lay witness 
friend.”  Showers II, 782 A.2d at 1023-24 (Tamilia, J., 
dissenting).  Judge Tamilia continued, “Such inaction by 
counsel caused appellant irreparable harm, exemplifies 
ineffectiveness and cannot be excused.”  Id. at 1024.   
 
With respect to the second prong of the Strickland 
ineffectiveness inquiry, the Superior Court found that 
Rudinski’s closing argument sufficiently exploited gaps in the 
Commonwealth’s evidence to overcome a finding of 
prejudice.  Id. at 1021.  The Court rested its conclusion on the 
belief that because the autopsy showed no masking agents in 
the deceased’s stomach (even if Roxanol could be masked), a 
second expert would not have added anything and Rudinski 
could have made the same closing arguments.  This 
conclusion is unreasonable and misreads the record.   
 
It is established that closing arguments are not to be 
considered evidence and the jury in this case was repeatedly 
so instructed.  See Pa. SSJI (Crim), §7.03 (2005) (“The 
speeches of counsel are not part of the evidence, and you 
should not consider them as such.”).  Moreover, as the 
District Court found, Rudinski’s closing “simply posed a 
number of questions to the jury” failing to establish crucial 
links.  Showers III, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 329.  An expert such as 
Dr. Wecht would have testified to the amount of the masking 
agent necessary to disguise such a large dose of morphine, 
time of absorption, and analyzed the autopsy results 
accordingly.  As found by the District Court and the 
dissenting member of the Superior Court, rebuttal testimony 
from a credible, objective expert witness such as Dr. Wecht 
would have cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s case and 
there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have 
been different.  It was unreasonable for the Superior Court 
majority to hold otherwise.   
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We also agree with the District Court that because the 
underlying claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness has merit, 
“there is a reasonable probability that Showers’ direct appeal 
would have been successful had appellate counsel adequately 
raised the issue.”  Id. at 331.  As the District Court concluded, 
Rudinski’s failure to raise the issue was “unreasonable and 
did prejudice the defense.”  Id. 
  
The Superior Court determined that counsel made a 
tactical decision not to include all of the arguments on appeal.  
This court agrees that counsel need not, and should not, raise 
every non-frivolous claim but rather may select among them 
in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.  
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000).  Here, however, 
without conducting an independent investigation of the need 
to consult an expert rebuttal witness, counsel ignored an 
argument going directly to the issue of guilt that is “clearly 
stronger than those presented.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  For 
example, appellate counsel included an argument challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence, which rarely prevails.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The fact that counsel had a reason for exclusion, the 
desire not to “shotgun” the appellate court, does not excuse 
his performance.  App. at 273.   
 
The Commonwealth provides no argument that 
appellate counsel was not ineffective except insofar as it 
rejects the claim that trial counsel was ineffective.  We agree 
with Showers that the Commonwealth has all but conceded 
the point.  Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court’s 
decision here is contrary to and an unreasonable application 
of clearly established federal law.   
 
III. 
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court granting habeas relief in the form of a new 
trial.11
 
   
 
                                              
     11 In light of our judgment, we will deny as moot Showers’ 
alternative request that we remand to the District Court for 
the determination of her remaining habeas claims. 
